United Nations A/70/650

General Assembly

Distr.: General
5 January 2016

Original: English

Seventieth session
Agenda item 119
Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations

Letter dated 4 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and referring to your note dated 21 January 2015, which refers to General Assembly resolution 69/121 of 10 December 2014, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives", I wish to state the following with regard to the recent incidents involving the premises of the Consulate General and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Mashad and Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively:

1. On Saturday, 2 January 2016, a large group of people gathered in front of the Saudi Arabian Consulate General in Mashad in protest against the unjustified and provocative execution of the high-ranking spiritual leader Ayatollah Sheikh Bagher Nimr Al-Nimr, arrested in 2012 in Saudi Arabia, following his efforts to advance democracy and freedom of speech, and beheaded by sword on 2 January 2016. Necessary measures, including an increase in the number of security forces, were taken to prevent any assault against the premises of the Consulate. Unfortunately, however, the objects hurled by a number of the protesters hit the glass windows of the premises.

2. On the same date, numerous protesters (around 8,000) staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran following the announcement of the execution of Sheikh Nimr. Some of the protesters, unfortunately, got out of control at around 11.00 p.m., and, despite the extensive efforts made by the law enforcement authorities, some of them managed to enter the Embassy and inflict some damage on the building.

3. Upon the arrival of police reinforcements, the protesters left the Embassy. More than 40 protesters were identified, arrested and handed over to the judicial authorities. An investigation is under way seeking to find other possible perpetrators.

4. While emphasizing its obligations in accordance with international law and relevant international instruments, especially the Vienna Convention on

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Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its regret over the referred-to incidents and will spare no efforts in arresting and prosecuting all those who brought them about. The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his message, stressed the need to pursue the issue and bring the elements behind the incidents to justice and provided necessary directions to the relevant government agencies, including the Ministry of the Interior. The Chief of the Judiciary also reiterated the need to pursue this case in all its aspects.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran will take necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents in the future.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 119.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/70/651–S/2016/1

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Identical letters dated 3 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you of the storming of and attack against the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia on 2 January 2016 in Tehran. While the Embassy's premises were violated, ransacked and set on fire, the Iranian authorities failed to fulfil their duties to provide adequate protection. A similar attack took place during the same day against the Consulate of Saudi Arabia in Mashhad, Iran. Once more, the Iranian authorities were idle and failed to fulfil their obligations, under international law, to prevent the attacks.

The Government of Saudi Arabia condemns in the strongest terms all acts of violence against our diplomatic premises. Moreover, we are appalled at the failure of the Iranian authorities to respect the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, and the obligations of host Governments, including under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusions or damage.

We call upon the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to ensure the inviolability of diplomatic facilities and the protection of all Saudi diplomats in Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

16-00314 (E) 130116

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United Nations A/70/652–S/2016/20

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 6 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the Ashgabat outcome document, adopted on 12 December 2015 as a final document of the high-level international conference on the theme "Policy of neutrality: international cooperation for peace, security and development", which was successfully held in Ashgabat on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan (see annex).

This conference was attended by an unprecedented number of Heads of State and Government, heads of international organizations, ministers for foreign affairs and high-ranking officials from countries representing different continents.

Initiated by permanently neutral Turkmenistan, as a country with a majority Muslim population, the conference contributed significantly to the peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations by offering tremendous opportunities to address the challenges and strengthen the conflict prevention and resolution tools of the Organization in turbulent regions.

Today, the international community has difficulty in keeping pace with the evolution of each conflict. We are finding it harder to end conflicts and to sustain peace. The outcome of the high-level international conference on the theme "Policy of neutrality: international cooperation for peace, security and development" is a valuable input to the international efforts in tackling pressing challenges to peace and security and ensuring a sustainable future for the next generations.

I would be very grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aksoltan **Ataeva**
Permanent Representative

16-00326 (E) 180116

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Annex to the letter dated 6 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Outcome document of the high-level international conference on the theme "Policy of neutrality: international cooperation for peace, security and development" (Ashgabat outcome document)

Heads of State and Government, Speakers of Parliaments, Ministers and officials of United Nations Member States, and representatives of entities of the United Nations system, international and regional organizations and academic institutions, reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, were assembled in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on 12 December 2015, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the neutrality of Turkmenistan, at the high-level international conference on the theme "Policy of neutrality: international cooperation for peace, security and development" pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 69/285 of 3 June 2015, entitled "Permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan".

Participants of the international conference

1. *Recognized* the significance of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 50/80 A of 12 December 1995 and 69/285 of 3 June 2015, entitled "Permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan", for maintaining peace and security at the regional and global levels,

2. *Affirmed* the importance of continuing to uphold the principles of sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity, self-determination and non-intervention in the internal affairs of any State, and to defend, promote and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered,

3. *Stressed* the importance of enhancing dialogue among religions, cultures and civilizations and maintaining a culture of peace, through supporting efforts made at the international level to reduce confrontation, suppress xenophobia and Islamophobia and promote respect for diversity,

4. *Underlined* that the policy of neutrality, being declared and pursued by the Member States of the United Nations, contributes to the strengthening of peace and security in relevant regions and at the global level and plays an important role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the countries of the world,

5. *Recognized* that the policy of neutrality is closely interconnected with and based on the tools of preventive diplomacy, such as early warning and prevention of conflict, mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions, negotiation, the use of special envoys, informal consultations, peacebuilding and targeted development activities,

6. *Noted* that preventive diplomacy is a core function of the United Nations and is central to the role of the United Nations Secretary-General, and in this regard recognized the important role of the special political missions of the United Nations

and the good offices of the Secretary-General in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding,

7. *Underlined* in this regard that the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, established in Ashgabat in December 2007 with the support of the international community, plays an important role in assisting the Central Asian States in addressing regional challenges by encouraging and facilitating closer cooperation among them, identifying and tackling potential sources of tension before a possible escalation, and responding to domestic and transnational challenges and threats to peace and security by supporting the sustainable development of the region,

8. *Affirmed* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, which are integral elements of the policy of neutrality, and called for an increase in the equal participation, representation and full involvement of women in preventive diplomacy efforts and all related decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding,

9. *Stressed* that the policy of permanent neutrality is a key factor for providing conditions and building a platform for peaceful negotiations, and in this regard underlined the contribution of neutral Turkmenistan in the United Nations-led inter-Tajik talks through the initiative to host the continual round of the inter-Tajik talks in Ashgabat in 1995-1996, and in addressing the conflict in Afghanistan by hosting inter-Afghan talks and an international forum on Afghanistan in 1997 and continuing to offer the territory of Turkmenistan for further inclusive, Afghan-led dialogue on reconciliation,

10. *Recognized* the positive role that the countries with the status of neutrality play in the provision and delivery of humanitarian assistance in situations of complex emergencies and natural disasters, in accordance with the guiding principles for the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system, including the principle of neutrality,

11. *Stressed* that the fundamental elements of the policy of neutrality are in accordance with the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, which are respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and peaceful coexistence, and in this regard *noted* the support by the Non-Aligned Movement of the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan expressed in the final document of the Eleventh Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in 1995,

12. *Emphasizing* that the phenomenon of the concept of neutrality needs to be developed, *welcomed* the initiative of Turkmenistan to establish the Centre for Studies and Research on the Neutrality Phenomenon in International Law and International Relations within existing capacities in order to study and disseminate the knowledge related to the policies of neutrality through training sessions and workshops delivered by experts and organizations specializing in relevant fields,

13. *Commending* the decision of the Government of Turkmenistan to declare 2015 the Year of Neutrality and Peace, *invited* Member and observer States of the United Nations, the organizations of the United Nations system and other international and regional organizations, as well as civil society, including non-governmental organizations and individuals, to consider the proposal to proclaim an International Day of Neutrality and observe this day through education

and public awareness-raising activities to strengthen the ideals of peace both within and among all nations and peoples,

14. *Underlining* that Turkmenistan regularly hosts the high-level international conferences on the policy of neutrality and *recognizing* that the dialogue on this theme contributes to the strengthening of global peace and security, *stressed* the need to continue convening such forums at least every five years,

15. *Expressed* deep appreciation and gratitude to the people and the Government of Turkmenistan for the excellent organization and hosting of the high-level international conference and the warm hospitality extended to the participants in the city of Ashgabat.

12 December 2015, Ashgabat

United Nations A/70/653

General Assembly

Distr.: General
11 January 2016
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 23 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a decision of the Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on parliamentarians of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization joining forces in countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism at the current time (Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, 26 November 2015), as well as the attached appeal to the parliaments of the nations of the world and international parliamentary organizations to join forces in countering terrorism and all forms of extremism at the current time (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

16-00320 (E) 180116

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Annex to the letter dated 23 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Decision of the Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on parliamentarians of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization joining forces in countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism at the current time

The Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, whose membership is as follows:

President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, G. G. Sahakyan; Vice-President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, E. O. Sharmazanov; Deputy Chair of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, V. A. Guminsky; Chair of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, K. J. Tokayev; Chair of the Mazhilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, K. K. Zhakypov; Chair of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, A. S. Zhehenbekov; Chair of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, S. E. Naryshkin; Deputy Chair of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Y. L. Vorobiev; and Chair of the Majlis-i Milli of the Majlis-i Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan, M. U. Ubaidulloev;

With the following observers:

Chair of the Lower Chamber (Wolesi Jirga) of the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, A. R. Ibraheemi; and member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, M. Drecun;

And these invited guests:

Speaker of the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, S. A. Sadiq; and Chair of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Assembly of the Islamic Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Alaeddin Boroujerdi;

Has decided:

1. To welcome the establishment of working contacts with the parliaments of States members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and indicate its readiness to grant them observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, pending receipt of applications for such status;

2. To take note of and support the Declaration by the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States on combating international terrorism, adopted at the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth, held in Astana on 16 October 2015;

3. To deem it necessary, given current conditions and the transnational ties and migration flows clearly emerging across the Eurasian region, to take measures

to harmonize and narrow any existing gaps among the basic provisions of the special laws of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on countering terrorism and extremism, with regard to:

- The central operative concepts in the legal regulation of efforts to counter terrorism and extremism
- The central concepts of national counter-terrorism policy and the primary areas of national policy to counter extremism
- Accountability for acts legally defined as extremist
- Implementation of counter-terrorism operations
- Procedures for monitoring the operations of political, civic, religious and other organizations in order to prevent manifestations of extremism by those organizations;

4. To adopt the appeal to the parliaments of the nations of the world and international parliamentary organizations to join forces in countering terrorism and all forms of extremism at the current time (see enclosure);

5. To direct the appeal mentioned in paragraph 4 of the present decision to the United Nations, States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Interparliamentary Assembly of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;

6. To approve the proposal introduced by the Chair of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, S. E. Naryshkin, and the Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Chung Ui-hwa, to hold a conference of speakers of parliaments of the Eurasian countries during the first half of 2016, in order for the parliaments of the Eurasian nations to join forces in countering terrorism and extremism.

(*Signed*) S. E. **Naryshkin**
Chair of the Parliamentary Assembly
Collective Security Treaty Organization

Saint Petersburg
26 November 2015

Enclosure

Appeal to the parliaments of the nations of the world and international parliamentary organizations to join forces in countering terrorism and all forms of extremism at the current time

The Council of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,

Recognizing the worldwide threats of terrorism and extremism at the current time, and realizing that only by joining forces will the international community be able to develop a comprehensive strategy to address them, and

Resolutely condemning the recent inhumane terrorist acts targeting Russia, France and other countries,

Appeals to the parliaments of the nations of the world and international parliamentary organizations to:

Call for an effective response to terrorism and for the unconditional suppression of the operations of international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and support the idea of a genuinely broad counter-terrorist coalition under United Nations auspices, to be based on the norms and principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations,

Join forces to ban, under international law and in all countries, the operations of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as well as those of other, similar extremist organizations, making use of United Nations mechanisms to do so,

Focus on strict implementation of the requirements contained in the counter-terrorism resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, while also noting the growing significance of the integrated approach to counter-terrorism reflected in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, having to do specifically with stripping terrorism of the sources of financial, ideological and human resources that sustain it,

Step up efforts to enhance national legislation and international legal norms to combat terrorism and suppress propaganda that encourages violence, ethnic intolerance and hatred,

Promote the adoption of political, legal, socioeconomic and other measures to prevent in a timely manner and effectively withstand threats emanating from terrorist fighters and groups, to include the suppression of financing of terrorism and extremism, by, inter alia, combating illegal commercial operations, organized crime and illicit trafficking in narcotics,

Voice a common resolve to extend their engagement to prevent, detect and suppress terrorist activity, both bilaterally and in other, multilateral formats.

United Nations A/70/654–S/2015/1014

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 January 2016
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 22 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information.

We should like to refer to our previous letters, in particular the letter issued under symbol S/2015/933, concerning the ongoing attacks by aircraft of the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America against the oil and gas installations and the economic infrastructure of Syria, under the pretext that the target is the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organization. Such attacks violate the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic. On Tuesday, 8 December 2015, aircraft belonging to that coalition bombed the Kubaybah oil terminal, which belongs to the Kawkab Petroleum Company, in Hasakah governorate. The attack resulted in the destruction of two 5,000 m^3 refined oil storage tanks; six 1,000 m^3 oil gathering tanks; the terminal's buildings and control systems; and the camp of the Chinese company that built the terminal.

On that same date, aircraft of the so-called coalition also bombed the administration and control building of the Markadah gas terminal of the Syrian Gas Company. The bombing of this terminal is unjustified given that it only processes raw gas; there is no oil there that could be stolen.

On Sunday, 13 December 2015, aircraft of the so-called coalition bombed the Sector 24 gas pipeline, which supplies an electrical power station in the Umar field. The attack cut off the supply of gas to the Dayr al-Zawr gas plant and took it out of service.

Those attacks by the so-called international coalition were preceded by a series of other attacks that caused significant economic losses and material damage, which are estimated to amount to hundreds of millions of dollars. Following is a listing of some of those attacks:

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- On 30 October 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the oil collection terminal in the Umar field, Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 3 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the Umar, Tanak and Jidu fields in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 4 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the perimeter of the Umar field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 30 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the Tanak field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 8 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked Abu Hardan well No. 136 and Barghuth wells Nos. 106, 108 and 120 in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 9 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked sites belonging to the Furat Petroleum Company in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 9 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked eight oil relay pumps, as well as the pumps' meters and auxiliary equipment, at the main Jafra terminal in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 9 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the Umar gas plant, the main oil collection point in the Umar field, collection substation GSA near the Umar gas plant and collection substation GSB in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 14 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked sites in the Umar field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 15 November 2015, coalition aircraft bombed the garage of the Jafra terminal in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 17 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the Umar, Malih, Sayjan and Azraq fields in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 19 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked sites at the Jafra terminal in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.
- On 19 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the Taym field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, causing a fire.
- On 5 and 6 November 2015, coalition aircraft attacked the main terminals of the Taym and Ward fields, and oil wells at the Umar field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, setting some of the wells on fire.

Aircraft of the coalition led by the United States of America have carried out dozens of attacks against Syrian economic facilities, instead of bombing ISIL and that group's vehicles, which are transporting stolen Syrian oil to Turkey. The coalition has not presented any information in that regard to the United Nations, as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions. The annex to the present letter lists the oil installations that American aircraft bombed in the period from 30 October to 15 November 2015 as part of the war that is being waged against Syria.

In that connection, we note that the armed terrorist groups that are stealing Syrian oil and selling it illegally through Turkish channels are not stealing it directly from terminals, but rather at points near the oil wells throughout Syria's oil fields.

Attacks by aircraft of the so-called coalition against the economic facilities and the infrastructure, and the unilateral coercive measures imposed by certain countries against the Syrian people are exacerbating the current difficult conditions in Syria.

In view of the deliberate destruction of the country's oil and economic installations, the Syrian Arab Republic reserves its right under international law to demand compensation from the States members of the American coalition for the damage that they have caused.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be issued as a document of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the identical letters dated 22 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	30 October 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the oil collection terminal in the Umar field.	Umar field	• An oil storage tank with a capacity of 30,000 barrels was struck and completely burned. • The air compressors and relay were bombed and completely destroyed. • Debris broke the power plant's windows and caused some structural damage.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	3 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed sites in Furat Petroleum Company fields.	Umar, Tanak and Jidu fields	• The main water treatment plant and the water injection collectors in the Umar field were bombed, damaging the pipes and some valves. This site had been previously bombed. • In the Umar field, a garage in the warehouse area near the chemical storage building was bombed, completely destroying the stores of chemicals and oil barrels. Debris scattered by the explosion punctured the chemical injection units. • The yard of the old garage was bombed, damaging some cranes and old tankers. • The points at which oil is stolen in the Tanak and Jidu fields were bombed.

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	3 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed sites on the perimeter of the Umar field.	Perimeter of the Umar field	The following sites at the Tanak field were bombed: Barghuth, Abu Ra'sayn, Abu Hardan and Malih.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	4 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the Umar field.	Umar field	The following sites were bombed: the oils and chemicals warehouses and the vehicle assembly point in the garage yard. Those sites had been previously bombed.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	8 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the Tanak field.	Tanak field	• An oil relay tank was bombed, causing an explosion and a fire. • The oil relay pumps were destroyed. • The auxiliary oil relay pumps were destroyed. • The assembly connecting the relay tanks and the relay pumps was destroyed. • Well sites on the perimeter of the Tanak field were bombed. • Two tanks used to store water for injection into wells were destroyed. • The oil collector was destroyed. • The gas collector was destroyed. • General damage was caused to the terminal by flying debris. • Three 200-bar injection pumps were destroyed.

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	8 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed Abu Hardan well No. 136 and Barghuth wells Nos. 102, 106 and 108.	Furat Petroleum Company fields	Abu Hardan well No. 136 was set ablaze. The fire was put out on 10 November 2015.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	9 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the company's sites in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.	Furat Petroleum Company sites	• The gas supply line linking the Dayr al-Zawr plant and the Jafra terminal was bombed. • The condenser loading area at the Izbah field was bombed, burning oil holding tanks Nos. 112, 113 and 114 and taking the terminal out of service. • The main Tanak terminal was bombed.
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	9 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed eight relay pumps, as well as the pumps' metres and auxiliary equipment, at the main Jafra terminal.	Jafra terminal	Eight relay pumps were completely destroyed.
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	9 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the earthen berm that surrounds Jafra well No. 116.	Jafra field	The earthen berm was damaged.
General Company for Phosphate and Mines	Homs	10 November 2015	Unidentified aircraft bombed the eastern phosphate mines.	Eastern phosphate mines	Parts of the manufacturing facilities, as well as the laundry and the housing complex were hit.

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	12 November 2015	Aircraft of the so-called coalition bombed the following sites in the Umar field: • The Umar gas plant • The main gas collection terminal at the Umar field • Collection substation GSA, near the Umar gas plant • Collection substation GSB	Umar field	Umar gas plant: • Parts of coolant compressor K203B were damaged; coolant compressor K203C was completely destroyed; and heat exchangers 627 to 929 were severely damaged. • The coolant compressor control panels were completely destroyed. • The line that supplies the output compressors was partially damaged. • The cables feeding the plant's solar unit were partially damaged. • Well No. 502, with a capacity of 50,000 barrels, at the main oil collection terminal was completely burned. • Large punctures and damage were caused to auxiliary water tank No. 403. • Water injection pump No. 36104, which supports the 200-bar pump, was completely destroyed. • Oil collection substation GSA sustained partial damage in separators 105, 106 and 107 (punctures) and in high pressure separator No. 103. • The pipe separators were completely destroyed. • • No damage at oil collection substation GSB.

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	14 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the perimeter of Jafra well No. 116.	Jafra field	• Bombing near the main collection terminal in the Umar field resulted in the destruction of two trailers. • Well sites in the Shahil field were bombed, but there were no fires.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	14 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed sites in the Umar field.	Umar field	The canopy of a garage, along with the surface and the parking spots, were bombed and destroyed.
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	15 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the garage at the Jafra terminal.	Jafra field	–
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	15 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the perimeter of Jafra well No. 104, just beyond the well's earthen berm.	Jafra field	–
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	15 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the perimeter of Jafra well No. 116, just beyond the well's earthen berm.	Jafra field	–
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	17 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the company's sites in Dayr al-Zawr governorate.	Umar, Malih, Sayjan and Azraq fields	• Substations GSC, GAB and GSA were attacked, causing damage to some oil collection tanks at those sites and resulting in a fire that burned for three hours before being extinguished. • The oil collection points in the Malih, Sayjan and Azraq fields were attacked.

Company	*Governorate*	*Date of attack*	*Description of attack*	*Location of attack*	*Damage caused by attack*
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	19 November 2015	Aircraft of the so-called coalition bombed sites at the Jafra terminal.	Jafra terminal	• The control room was bombed, destroying parts of the control room's structure and its contents, such as the electrical panels and the cables, along with their carriers. • Production water treatment tank No. 601 was bombed and completely destroyed, including all connecting pipes, pumps and auxiliary equipment. • The pipes in the area of the separator were bombed, damaging all of the pipes and their platforms. • The storage yard behind the warehouse was bombed, destroying the canopy and the materials in the warehouse.
Furat Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	20 November 2015	Forces of the so-called coalition bombed the Taym oil field in Dayr al-Zawr governorate, causing fires that burned for two hours.	Taym field	Damage will be assessed later.
Dayr al-Zawr Petroleum Company	Dayr al-Zawr	22 November 2015	Aircraft of the so-called coalition bombed the cement drainage tanks at the Jafra terminal.	–	Tanks, along with their metal covers and the pumps mounted on top of them, were destroyed. The oil that remained in the tanks was set ablaze.

United Nations A/70/655

General Assembly

Distr.: General
6 January 2016
English
Original: Russian

Seventieth session
Agenda item 70
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Letter dated 30 December 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a declaration by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the inadmissibility of the desecration or destruction of places of remembrance and graves of Soviet soldiers in the Republic of Poland (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 70.

(*Signed*) P. **Iliichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

16-00161 (E) 080116

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 December 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the State Duma on the inadmissibility of the desecration or destruction of places of remembrance and graves of Soviet soldiers in the Republic of Poland

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation expresses its profound indignation at the desecration and destruction of graves, tombstones, monuments and other memorials in the Republic of Poland commemorating the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the sake of that country's liberation from fascism.

Decisions officially approved by Warsaw to dismantle memorial sites, in conjunction with acts of vandalism committed by unidentified persons who, as a rule, go unpunished, have begun to typify the attitude towards places of remembrance and graves of soldiers and officers of the Red Army on Polish soil. To our country, which vanquished Nazism at the cost of colossal effort and millions of human lives, such actions are totally unacceptable.

In the view of the State Duma, this represents a direct challenge to the ideals of all the stalwart anti-fascists who gave their lives fighting to free the peoples of Europe from the Nazi yoke.

The deputies of the State Duma express their indignation at the ceaseless attempts to rewrite history by downplaying the contribution of the Soviet people to the defeat of Hitler's Germany and distorting the role of the Red Army in the liberation of Poland.

In 2015 alone, there were nearly thirty cases of desecration or destruction of Soviet memorial sites in the Republic of Poland. Yet the Polish authorities have not seen fit to comment on these sacrilegious acts of vandalism. Not a single statement by a representative of State authority condemning such actions comes to mind, and official investigations into these high-profile crimes have in many cases ended by exonerating those responsible.

The decision to remove the monument erected to a twice-decorated Hero of the Soviet Union, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, at the site of his death in Pieniężno; the desecration by unidentified vandals of more than 50 tombstones and monuments on the graves of Soviet soldiers in the Milejczyce city cemetery, where some 1,600 Red Army soldiers killed on Polish soil are buried; and the dismantling of the monument to the Soviet liberator soldier in Mielec at the end of November 2015 should be seen as consequences of that policy. A few days earlier in November 2015, in the city of Garwolin, unknown perpetrators destroyed dozens of tombstones in the military cemetery, where more than 10,000 of our soldiers are buried. These are only a few examples of the outrages committed against memorial sites.

In the view of the deputies of the State Duma, the fact that these incidents have occurred in Poland in the year of the seventieth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 to 1945, and the end of the Second World War, denotes a particular degree of cynicism.

The State Duma draws the attention of the Polish leadership to the need to implement faithfully the agreement of 22 February 1994 between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Poland on graves and places of remembrance of the victims of wars and repression. The need "to honour their commitments under bilateral or multilateral treaties on the maintenance and conservation of monuments, including those containing the remains of foreign soldiers or war victims" is also highlighted in paragraph 9.5 of resolution 1652 (2009) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, entitled "Attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in Council of Europe member states".

For its part, the Russian Federation will honour all of its commitments to preserve and maintain places of remembrance and graves of Polish nationals (such as those in the Provinces of Smolensk and Tver) by ensuring the conservation and proper maintenance of graves, tombstones, monuments and other memorials.

The State Duma calls on the Sejm of the Republic of Poland to put an end to the war on monuments and memorial sites. Monuments, obelisks and tombstones of soldiers and officers of the Red Army who gave their lives for the liberation of Poland should be scrupulously protected by the State.

The deputies of the State Duma call on the Polish authorities to make every effort to find and punish the vandals responsible for these offences and to undertake the immediate restoration of the destroyed tombstones and memorials, which stand as testaments of profound respect for acts of military heroism.

The deputies of the State Duma remain staunch advocates of strengthening relations of friendship and good-neighbourliness with all peoples, and stand ready to continue to strive to ensure that Russian-Polish relations are based solely on a desire to cooperate fully for the benefit of our peoples and States.

S.Y. **Naryshkin**

Moscow
18 December 2015

United Nations A/70/656

General Assembly

Distr.: General
6 January 2016

Original: English

Seventieth session
Agenda items 20, 34, 72, 116 and 122

Sustainable development

Prevention of armed conflict

Promotion and protection of human rights

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Letter dated 24 December 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly

In late 2013, I launched the Human Rights Up Front Initiative to strengthen United Nations prevention, including of serious human rights violations and conflict. Transparency, dialogue and cooperation are guiding principles of the Initiative.

I have referred to the Human Rights Up Front Initiative in many public statements. In addition, the Deputy Secretary-General sought the views of Member States in December 2013 at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly and in a meeting with them in Geneva in July 2014. I have suggested that he provide another, more detailed briefing on my behalf to the Assembly in January 2016.

The Charter of the United Nations and repeated resolutions by Member States have given guidance to the United Nations system to protect human rights and strengthen prevention. They have also prompted the system to connect its actions across the three pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights.

My Human Rights Up Front Initiative is a major effort to achieve existing prevention mandates through cultural and operational change and engagement with Member States. It is not a human rights tool, but it should lead to the prevention of human rights violations. It is also intended to lead to improved early warning, efficiency, support for national authorities and internal accountability. An initial result is greater recognition among United Nations staff of how problems in the development pillar can affect the human rights and peace and security pillars, and vice versa.

16-00145 (E) 070116

Please recycle

While the Initiative is internal, its objectives speak to the purposes of the whole United Nations and will be greatly enhanced by support from Member States. The briefing in January is intended to strengthen the dialogue with Member States on the Initiative.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations A/70/657–S/2016/24

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 28 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from the Government of Ukraine, I have the honour to enclose herewith the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine to parliaments of foreign States, the European Parliament and parliamentary assemblies of international organizations to extend and toughen sanctions against the Russian Federation for the organization of terrorist acts in Ukraine (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-00322 (E) 150116

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 28 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine to parliaments of foreign States, the European Parliament and parliamentary assemblies of international organizations to extend and toughen sanctions against the Russian Federation for the organization of terrorist acts in Ukraine

The Russian Federation continues to violate blatantly the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and is turning into a terrorist State. The increasing number of arrested terrorists, who are citizens of the Russian Federation and Ukraine and have been trained in special centres for reconnaissance and sabotage groups located on the territory of the Russian Federation to carry out terrorist attacks in Ukraine, pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the neighbouring States, while their involvement in the aggression against the people of Syria is evidence of the policy of transnational terrorism pursued by the Russian Federation's top rulers.

On 9 December 2015, members of yet another subversive terrorist group, with Russian citizens at its core, were apprehended in the cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv. The attempts to carry out terrorist acts and subversive activities in major cities of Ukraine represent proof that the Russian Federation is embarking on a course of State terrorism.

In view thereof, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine calls on parliaments of foreign States, the European Parliament and parliamentary assemblies of international organizations to:

- Demand that the Russian Federation cease its aggression against Ukraine;
- Extend and toughen sanctions against the Russian Federation;
- Establish personalized sanctions lists targeting the Russian Federation's top rulers who have introduced the regime of State terrorism;
- Intensify the international monitoring of the situation in the territories occupied by the Russian Federation in the areas of human rights and freedoms, and respond immediately to any such violations;
- Support the efforts of Ukraine aimed at the release of its citizens illegally kept in detention in the territory of the Russian Federation;
- Prevent impunity for those responsible for crimes against humanity committed since the beginning of the Russian terrorist aggression against Ukraine;
- Demand the full and unconditional implementation by the Russian Federation of its Minsk commitments.

We demand that the Russian Federation cease its aggression against Ukraine, release immediately and unconditionally all Ukrainian political hostages and prisoners, and abandon the practices of international terrorism.

United Nations A/70/658–S/2016/23

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 8 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the letter of Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, regarding the recent unfortunate developments between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-00251 (E) 120116

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to begin by wishing you a happy, healthy and peaceful 2016 and to brief you about the unfortunate developments between Iran and Saudi Arabia that have unfolded in the past few days.

We are taking the final steps to announce the Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the E3/EU+3 next week. We had all hoped — and continue to believe — that the resolution of the nuclear issue would enable all of us to focus on addressing the real challenge of extremist violence and terrorism that is ravaging our region and the world. President Rouhani has repeatedly declared that his foreign policy priorities are friendship with neighbours, peace and stability in the region and constructive engagement across the globe. His initiative for a World Against Violence and Extremism (WAVE) received unanimous support from the United Nations General Assembly in 2013, promising a more enlightened far-sighted global campaign against this menace.

Regrettably, immediately after the successful conclusion of the first interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3/EU+3 in November 2013, Saudi Arabia focused all its resources to prevent or defeat a comprehensive deal and preclude normalization in the region. Today, there are indications that some in Saudi Arabia are on a mission to drag the entire region into conflict, fearing that removal of the smokescreen of the manufactured Iranian nuclear threat would expose the real global threat posed by extremists and their sponsors. It is an unfortunate reality that most extremist perpetrators of acts of terror from 11 September 2001 to the recent senseless terrorist shooting in San Bernardino and all other episodes of extremist carnage in between — whether in Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul and Peshawar or in Paris, London, Moscow, Madrid and Ottawa — and most members of Al-Qaida, the Taliban, ISIS and the Al-Nusrah Front were either Saudi nationals or those miseducated in Saudi-financed schools or otherwise brainwashed by petro-financed demagogues, who have promoted an anti-Islamic message of hatred, exclusion and sectarianism across the globe for decades.

The Saudi strategy to derail the nuclear agreement and maintain and even exacerbate tension in the region has focused on three interrelated domains: public relations and pressure in the West, promotion of and even active engagement in war and violence in the region and direct provocation against Iran. Examples of the first two are well known, while the cases of provocation against Iran have not grabbed international headlines thanks primarily to Iranian prudent restraint.

The Saudi public relations machine in Washington, with its strange bedfellows, spared no effort to mislead the United States public about the nuclear agreement throughout last summer. While it failed to defeat the nuclear deal, it now works overtime to compensate by spreading delusional hype against Iran.

On another front, in addition to supporting extremist terrorists in Syria and elsewhere, the senseless war waged by Saudi Arabia in Yemen has raged for nearly 10 months of a senseless aerial campaign targeting the people of Yemen. At the same time, impeding humanitarian access has led to the starvation of innocent civilians in Yemen, and all international efforts to establish a ceasefire and begin a dialogue between Yemeni groups and factions have been thwarted by Saudi Arabia.

Saudi authorities have also engaged in numerous direct and at times lethal provocations against Iran, as the third pillar of this strategy. Iranian self-restraint has prevented this concerted campaign to achieve its goal of exacerbating tension:

- Saudi bombers have hit Iranian diplomatic facilities in Yemen several times, including on 24 April and 18 September 2015 and 7 January 2016, killing two local service personnel, injuring a number of Yemeni guards and inflicting damage on the buildings;
- Saudi authorities have persistently mistreated Iranian pilgrims, fuelling public outrage in Iran:
  - On 28 March 2015, two Saudi immigration officers sexually molested two Iranian boys in Jeddah Airport in broad daylight. They have yet to be punished, as promised, for a crime that they and their extremist cohorts continue to shamelessly boast about on Saudi social media;
  - On 24 September 2015, as a result of the stampede during the Haj pilgrimage in Mena, a suspiciously disproportionate number of Iranian pilgrims — 464 innocent men, women, elderly persons and children — were killed, mostly because of at least utter Saudi negligence, and 521 were injured. For days, Saudi authorities arrogantly refused to respond to the repeated requests by the grieved families and the Iranian Government to have access to and repatriate the bodies, a problem that continues to linger;
- Saudi Government-appointed preachers have made a routine practice of hate speech not only against Iran but against all Shiite Muslims. One most nefarious example is a sermon on 31 March 2015 by Abdul Rahman al-Sudais, the Government-appointed prayer leader at the Mecca Holy Mosque, in which he made a litany of hate speech and incitement for violence against all Shiites, including: "Our war with Iran, say that out loud, is a war between Sunnis and Shiites ... Our war with Iran ... is truly sectarian. If it was not sectarian, we will make it sectarian ... Our disagreement with Rafidha [a derogatory reference to Shiites] will not be removed, nor our suicide to fight them ... as long as they are on the face of the earth ...."[a] The provocative and unjustifiable beheading of a leading Shiite scholar on 2 January 2016 followed another hate speech by the same demagogue on 1 January 2016;
- Saudi Arabia has also engaged in publicly declared economic warfare against Iran, boasting about its intention to strangulate the Iranian economy through a drastic reduction of oil prices;
- Saudi-backed terrorists have repeatedly targeted Iranian diplomatic posts, most notably through suicide attacks in Beirut on 19 November 2013 and in Peshawar on 24 February 2014, killing two Iranian diplomats, four Lebanese and three Pakistani security guards, injuring many innocent bystanders and causing extensive damage to the buildings.

In all these cases, the Islamic Republic of Iran, confident of the strength of its cause, conviction and people, refused to retaliate or break or even reduce diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Iran has called for Islamic unity in the face of Saudi

[a] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r_2e6AlOhdE.

sectarian hate-mongering. And while the Saudi Government or its agents directly targeted Iranian diplomatic facilities, killing Iranian diplomats and other nationals, the Iranian Government has unequivocally condemned the assault against the Saudi Embassy and Consulate on 2 January 2016, ensured the safety and dignity of all Saudi diplomats, took immediate measures to help restore the Saudi diplomatic compound, declared at the highest level its determination to bring all perpetrators to justice, took disciplinary action against those failing to perform their duties to protect diplomatic compounds, and initiated an internal investigation to determine the causes and prevent any recurrence. Let me reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to comply with all its obligations in accordance with international law and relevant international instruments, especially the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.

We have no desire for or interest in an escalation of tension in our neighbourhood. We all need to be united in the face of continued threats posed by extremists against all of us. In fact, from the first days after his election, President Rouhani and I have sent public and private signals to Saudi Arabia about our readiness to engage in dialogue and accommodation to promote regional stability and combat destabilizing extremist violence. Saudi Arabia has to make a crucial choice. Either it can continue supporting extremist terrorists and promoting sectarian hatred, or it can opt for good-neighbourliness and play a constructive role in promoting regional stability. We hope that Saudi Arabia will be persuaded to heed the call of reason.

(*Signed*) M. Javad **Zarif**

United Nations A/70/659

General Assembly

Distr.: General
11 January 2016

Original: English

Seventieth session
Item 79 (a)
Oceans and the law of the sea

Letter dated 7 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit diplomatic notes dated 2 January 2016 (see annex I), and 7 January 2016 (see annex II), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam addressed to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ha Noi concerning China's conduct of test flights to the airfield which China had illegally built at Đá Chữ Thập (Fiery Cross Reef) of Viet Nam's Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelago on 2 January 2016 and on 6 January 2016.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79 (a).

(*Signed*) **Nguyen** Phuong Nga
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations

16-00330 (E) 140116

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 7 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Regardless of Viet Nam's protest, on 2 January 2016, China conducted test flights to the airfield which China had illegally built at Đá Chữ Thập (Fiery Cross Reef) of Viet Nam's Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelago.

China's above-mentioned action has seriously infringed upon Viet Nam's sovereignty over Truong Sa Archipelago. It is contrary to the common understanding reached between high-level Leaders of Viet Nam and China, the Agreement on the Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea Issues between the two countries, and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). This action also does harm to peace and stability in the East Sea (South China Sea), reduces political trust between the two countries and has negative impacts upon the neighbourly relations and good sentiments between Vietnamese and Chinese peoples.

Viet Nam resolutely protests the above-mentioned action by China. We request China to immediately stop and not to repeat similar actions. Instead, China should take concrete and practical actions contributing to maintaining peace, stability, security, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation in the East Sea.

Ha Noi, 2 January 2016

Annex II to the letter dated 7 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 6 January 2016, two Chinese large aircrafts landed on the airfield that China had illegally built at Đá Chữ Thập (Fiery Cross Reef) of Viet Nam's Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelago.

Viet Nam, once again, vehemently opposes this action by China, which gravely violates Viet Nam's sovereignty, endangers peace and stability in the region and threatens the security, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation in the East Sea (South China Sea). Viet Nam resolutely requests China to put an immediate end to similar actions, desist from further actions violating Viet Nam's sovereignty over Truong Sa Archipelago, respect relevant regulations in international law and refrain from actions that broaden and aggravate the disputes.

Ha Noi, 7 January 2016

United Nations A/70/660

General Assembly

Distr.: General
13 January 2016

Original: English

Seventieth session
Agenda item 134
Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

Progress in the implementation of the organizational resilience management system

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/247 B, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, not later than at its seventieth session, a progress report on the implementation of the organizational resilience management system and of the recommendations emanating from the after-action review of storm Sandy.

In the same resolution, the General Assembly requested information on the steps taken to expand the organizational resilience management system to include offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, field missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs and the participating specialized agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system.

The report provides background information on and the vision for the organizational resilience management system and a summary of the system's expected impact on the ability of the Organization to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies. It focuses mainly on the status of implementation of the system at United Nations Headquarters in New York, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, field missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs and the participating specialized agencies, funds and programmes.

The report also provides an update on the complete implementation of the recommendations emanating from the after-action review of storm Sandy.

The General Assembly is requested to take note of the report.

16-00403 (E) 200116

Please recycle

I. Background

1. In section III of its resolution 68/247 B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the implementation of the organizational resilience management system, including information on the steps taken to expand the system to include the specialized agencies, funds and programmes. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. Storm Sandy demonstrated the vulnerability of the Organization's operations to disruptive events, which can potentially cause a loss of core systems. The response of the United Nations Secretariat to the impact of storm Sandy on Headquarters operations was a reminder of the need for coordinated collective action at all levels to emergency events, to protect personnel and assets and enable the Organization to continue to deliver its mandates.

3. In the following paragraphs, the objectives and systemic approach of the organizational resilience management system are summarized to provide a brief overview of the system. The system policy is described in detail in earlier reports of the Secretary-General (A/67/266 and A/66/516).

4. The organizational resilience management system reflects the common need to:

(a) Establish a framework that describes the relationships among the components that constitute the emergency management landscape;

(b) Enhance the management of operational risk;

(c) Support efforts at the field office level to implement emergency management programmes by adopting a common system that allows offices to leverage each other's capacity and harmonize activities around common principles.

5. The emergency management practice of the United Nations has evolved and adapted to ever-changing risks in an increasingly complex environment. The Organization has expanded emergency management to include business continuity in response to the global threat of pandemic influenza in the beginning of the new century; medical emergency response and support to survivors and their families following the catastrophic impact of the Haiti earthquake in January 2010; and in crisis communications, reflecting their criticality as a lesson learned from the storm Sandy response. The organizational resilience management system represents the latest phase in the Organization's approach to emergency management, linking risk-based emergency preparedness and response disciplines across the continuum of preparedness, prevention, response and recovery.

6. The elements of the system — crisis management, security management, business continuity, information technology disaster recovery, medical emergency response, crisis communications, support to staff, survivors and families, and vital records and premises management — share a common basis and objective, namely to enhance the management of risks that could disrupt the Organization's operations. These operational risks, defined as the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events,[1] are typically complex and require joint action from effective management. The system contributes to effective operational risk management by

[1] This definition was taken from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

prioritizing threats through a joint risk assessment and then aligning efforts to jointly prevent and mitigate them under a common governance structure. The common governance structure mitigates unintentional internal risk transfer. A common framework also enables easier implementation in offices without dedicated resources.

7. To date, premises and records management have not been adequately reflected in the description of the system. Both services, however, have always been part of the emergency management efforts to safeguard the physical assets and provide technical advice on records management, as follows:

(a) Premises management supports organizational resilience through sound infrastructure design and space planning, minimizing the potential for operational disruption, continuing the proactive maintenance of physical assets and life safety systems, deploying technical staff and contractors in response to emergency situations and coordinating with building management in leased spaces;

(b) Records management: access to and the protection of paper and electronic records are intrinsic to support decision-making and protect the interests of the United Nations during all kinds of emergencies. Sound records management practices will ensure that records remain accessible, protected and authoritative at all times. Records management also provides the appropriate framework for the identification and protection of vital records, which are a subset of the records created by the United Nations to maintain critical operations (e.g. building floor plans) and meeting core United Nations obligations (e.g. payroll information) in emergencies.

II. Vision for the organizational resilience management system

8. The organizational resilience management system is a comprehensive emergency management framework linking actors and activities across preparedness, prevention, response and recovery and consists of the following processes:

- Policy and plan development
- Risk assessment and mitigation
- Situational awareness
- Crisis management decision-making, operations execution and coordination
- Recovery of people and assets and reconstitution of business processes
- Review of actions and identifying lessons to improve processes
- Execution and training
- Implementation of lessons learned

9. The system comprises integrated decision-making and operation coordination bodies, linking the core elements to ensure that processes are undertaken in a timely and coherent manner. A graphical representation of the system, by emergency management phase and process, is detailed in the figure below.

Organizational resilience management system



10. Based on the iterative process of continuous learning and improvement, and empowering personnel to tailor the implementation to meet local conditions, the principles of the system are as follows:

(a) **Risk-based planning and practice**. Duty station emergency management plans are based on a joint assessment of risks that could disrupt operations, in line with existing United Nations system-wide policies and guidelines;

(b) **Flexible standardization**. The fundamental roles, responsibilities and practices are tailored to reflect local context, leveraging existing resources and processes;

(c) **Harmonized and integrated implementation**. The planning, structures and behavioural change components are implemented in coordination with Member States, host country authorities and other key partners;

(d) **Maximized organizational learning**. Lessons learned during testing and implementation will be identified, recorded and shared.

11. The implementation of the systemic approach of the organizational resilience management system represents a transformative change in the Organization's emergency risk management. This change is consistent with the global trend towards a more comprehensive approach to operational risk management.[2] The United Nations and participating common system entities aim to enhance the ability to ensure the safety and security of personnel and assets, and to deliver mandates in the face of disruptive events, by ensuring the coherence of emergency management according to the system policy across the United Nations system.

12. The organizational resilience management system represents a systematized way of coordinating different key components within and across the entities of the United Nations common system. Thanks to the systemic approach, the system induces gains of synergies and effectiveness and ensures best usage of its resources.

[2] See United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013* (New York, 2013), p. 186.

III. Progress in implementation

13. A major development in the efforts to implement the organizational resilience management system was the approval of its policy for the United Nations common system. The policy was approved by the High-level Committee on Management of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination in October 2014. The policy was subsequently endorsed by the Board at its session held in November 2014 and became effective as of 1 December 2014.

14. The United Nations and participating common system entities have formed an interdepartmental and inter-agency working group comprising representatives of Secretariat departments, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and agencies, funds and programmes. The working group is chaired by the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services, who delegated this responsibility to the Chief of the Business Continuity Management Unit.

15. The working group developed an implementation strategy consisting of key performance indicators and a regime prescribing the necessary maintenance, exercise and review of all emergency preparedness and response plans.

16. The key performance indicators provide benchmarks to help to measure the success of implementation in the following areas:

(a) Policy;

(b) Governance;

(c) Maintenance, exercise and review;

(d) Risk management;

(e) Planning.

17. The purpose of the maintenance, exercise and review regime is to ensure that emergency management capability reflects the nature, scale and complexity of the organization that it supports, that it is current, accurate and complete and that actions are taken to continually improve organizational resilience[3] and integrates all components of the system.

18. Under the maintenance, exercise and review programme:

(a) All aspects of incident response and recovery will be exercised;

(b) Emergency management plans will be kept up to date;

(c) Required documentation, such as event after-action reviews, will be maintained and distributed to the appropriate offices in a timely manner;

(d) Emergency management capabilities or lack thereof will be evaluated and serve as the basis for the cyclical process of continuous learning.

Implementation within the United Nations Secretariat

19. Each Secretariat duty station was requested by the Under-Secretary-General for Management to appoint a project manager to lead the local implementation of the system and the harmonization of emergency management plans. The system also

[3] Business Continuity Institute, Good Practice Guidelines (2013).

provided guidance for the different steps of its successful implementation, including:

(a) Undertaking a joint integrated assessment of risks that could disrupt operations and implementing coordinated risk prevention and mitigation actions in line with existing United Nations system-wide policies and guidelines;

(b) Establishing centralized, integrated decision-making and operations coordination;

(c) Harmonizing all necessary crisis and emergency management plans;

(d) Facilitating the maintenance, exercise and training regime;

(e) Applying the key performance indicators for measuring the Organization's progress in implementing the system.

Implementation at United Nations Headquarters in New York

20. The United Nations Headquarters made important progress in complying with the key performance indicators:

(a) Policy: since 2013, the United Nations Headquarters has implemented the General Assembly's decision contained in its resolution 67/254 A on the organizational resilience management system, which integrates all relevant emergency management planning instruments. To promulgate the policy among the staff population, a Secretary-General's bulletin is being prepared;

(b) Governance: under the oversight of the Senior Emergency Policy Team,[4] the Under-Secretary-General for Management was appointed the system's project owner. The Under-Secretary-General for Management delegated this responsibility to the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services. During the past year, the governance structure, consisting of the Senior Emergency Policy Team and the Crisis Operations Group, was strengthened through the establishment of the Emergency Operations Centre;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: a number of activities were offered to staff and families, varying from supporting staff relocating to countries in a public health crisis to making available booklets for emergency preparedness, also available online. Multiple learning opportunities, both online and face-to-face, were offered, ranging from technical emergency management courses to workshops on soft skills for crisis responders and managers and orientation sessions for departmental focal points on how to conduct the maintenance and exercise regime in their departments. A simulation "tabletop" exercise was conducted for the members of the Crisis Operations Group and the Senior Emergency Policy Team in December 2015, and an after-action review is being conducted in the spirit of continuous learning. An automated emergency notification system for all staff members in New York was implemented in January 2016;

(d) Risk management: a holistic risk assessment, including risks in the areas of security, medical and information technology disaster recovery, as well as risks to business continuity, was conducted and a risk map developed. On the basis of this

[4] The Senior Emergency Policy Team is chaired by the Chef de Cabinet and comprises senior management of most departments of the Secretariat, as well as high-level representatives from the specialized agencies, funds and programmes based in New York.

risk map, emergency management plans and tools are continually developed and maintained. The corporate information technology disaster recovery strategy was developed and its implementation has started;

(e) Planning: United Nations Headquarters developed all plans related to the emergency management framework and published a streamlined version in the form of the system "playbook" in the fourth quarter of 2015.

21. Significant progress was made at offices away from Headquarters, in regional commissions and in peacekeeping and special political missions.

Implementation at offices away from Headquarters

United Nations Office at Geneva

22. The United Nations Office at Geneva made significant progress in the implementation of actions related to the five areas of the system's key performance indicators:

(a) Policy: the Office adopted the system policy as endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management and made the policy document widely available through the intranet and an online collaboration platform utilized by the Crisis Management Team. The policy has also been shared with the Team and with the system's focal points in the wider United Nations in Geneva;

(b) Governance: the Director-General of the Office appointed the Director of Administration programme manager for the system in 2014. He is supported by the Office's Business Continuity Coordinator. System implementation activities at the Office are overseen by the Crisis Management Team in Geneva, chaired by the Director-General. The Team comprises representatives from the Office's main client entities (Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), as well as representatives of the Office's key administrative and support functions. The Team has adopted detailed terms of reference that clarify the roles and responsibilities of all its members and meets at least twice each year;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: the Office is providing system information to staff through the intranet and is working with other agencies and United Nations Headquarters to develop more comprehensive awareness-raising material for staff in 2016. The Team is repeatedly and thoroughly briefed on the system, and an annual tabletop exercise is conducted. Individual sections of the Office conduct regular telecommuting exercises;

(d) Risk management: the Office has a draft enterprise risk management risk register in place, which will be submitted to its senior management for formal approval. The Office's Safety and Security Service maintains the security risk assessment and updates it annually, with the update for 2015 also including risks related to the ongoing major renovation programme. The Office will conduct a joint system risk assessment with relevant stakeholders during the first quarter of 2016;

(e) Planning: the following emergency response plans are in place at the Office: an organizational resilience management system crisis management playbook for the Crisis Management Team, which includes the Office's business

continuity plan; a security plan for Switzerland; information technology disaster recovery procedures for critical applications; a draft crisis communications plan; a draft mass casualty incident response plan; and a draft staff support plan. All plans are harmonized and aligned with the system framework. The Team is responsible for approving the plans and deciding on their activation. The plans are regularly reviewed and updated; the business continuity information has recently been updated in view of the implementation of Umoja.

23. The United Nations Office at Geneva is leading the coordination group in Geneva, which includes UNHCR, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The Geneva system group developed a system template, which was adopted by the global working group on the organizational resilience management system and shared with all United Nations entities during the meeting of the High-level Committee on Management held in October 2015.

United Nations Office at Nairobi

24. Owing to the heightened security situation in Kenya and in Nairobi, the United Nations Office at Nairobi made progress in strengthening its emergency preparedness and ability to respond to an emergency situation, as follows:

(a) Policy: the Office adopted the system policy as endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management and ensured its active promulgation through the Security Management Team, the country team for Kenya and the established crisis management, security and business continuity planning groups. Information on emergency plans is available to staff on wallet cards, in the Gigiri weekly security advisories and on the intranet;

(b) Governance: early in 2014, the Office established its core Crisis Management Team, comprising senior representatives of the United Nations Environment Programme, the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and the Office's key managers. The core Team is chaired by the Office's Director of Administrative Services, who is also the designated project manager of the system;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: the latest set of exercises conducted at the Office complex in 2015 involved a mass casualty incident scenario, starting with an on-site incident command/medical drill, a joint activation of the crisis hotline call centre and the security control room to validate standard operating procedures on the identification and prioritization of affected staff members;

(d) Risk management: the Department of Safety and Security maintains a detailed security risk assessment, whose latest version was endorsed in November 2015. The security risk assessment is supplemented by the business continuity management risk assessment, addressing uncovered threats and operational risks;

(e) Planning: the crisis management handbook describes the terms of reference of the various crisis response groups and practical information. Since its endorsement by the Security Management Team at the end of 2014, the handbook

has served as a reference for activation and coordination of the various emergency plans under the system framework. The content of the handbook is regularly reviewed and validated by the Crisis Management Team through yearly simulation exercises, or each time a significant change occurs.

United Nations Office at Vienna

25. The United Nations Office at Vienna made important progress in the implementation of its emergency management framework according to the principles of the system:

(a) Policy: the Office adopted the system policy as endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management and created an intranet site to facilitate widespread dissemination of the policy and related documentation;

(b) Governance: the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna and Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) appointed the Director for the Division for Management as the system's project manager. He is supported by the organizational resilience management system and business continuity focal point. System implementation activities are overseen by the Executive Committee, chaired by the Director-General/Executive Director. Various crisis management groups were established, and their specific roles and responsibilities are being clarified;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: key managers have been briefed and trained on the system with the assistance of the Business Continuity Coordinator of the United Nations Office at Geneva. A tabletop simulation exercise conducted by external facilitators was successfully concluded in September 2015;

(d) Risk management: the United Nations Office at Vienna has an enterprise risk management risk register, which was approved by senior management of the Office and UNODC in 2014. It is reviewed and updated on a continuous basis. The United Nations Office at Vienna Safety and Security Service maintains the security risk assessment and updates it annually. A joint system risk assessment will be conducted with relevant stakeholders in the first half of 2016;

(e) Planning: the following emergency response plans are in place in Vienna: a security plan for the Vienna International Centre, a mass casualty incident plan and a crisis management plan. The business continuity and crisis communication plans, as well as procedures for information technology disaster recovery for critical applications, exist in draft form.

Status of implementation in peacekeeping operations and special political missions

26. Following full implementation of the system policy for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs at United Nations Headquarters, the policy was promulgated in the field in August 2015, with a completion date of June 2016 for the first two departments. Organizational resilience focal points nominated by their missions were provided five-day training courses on the system at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy, to help to support system implementation in the field. United Nations Headquarters has supported the focal points remotely through webinar training sessions, one-on-one engagement on mission-specific needs and regular group follow-up on system-related matters.

27. The status of implementation of the system across peacekeeping and special political missions is variable but proceeding very well overall, considering the short time period since the promulgation of the policy. All field missions are in the process of establishing system governance structures, and most missions are now fully engaged in developing the required emergency plans (crisis management, business continuity, mass casualty, security, information technology disaster recovery, crisis information, crisis communications and staff support plans). System focal points are working with key stakeholders to ensure that all emergency plans are being harmonized and a regular planning review programme is established. Some missions have requested Headquarters support to assist in the development of business continuity and crisis communication plans. Maintenance, exercise and review programmes are being implemented, and several missions have requested Headquarters support in developing and facilitating testing exercises. Security and information technology disaster recovery planning is well established in all missions.

28. To enhance the capacity established by the full roll-out of an integrated business continuity management framework in the peacekeeping and special political missions, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Safety and Security are collaborating to develop crisis management guidance for peacekeeping and special political missions and logistics facilities, which will be aligned with the system's principles.

Status of implementation in regional commissions

29. The Economic Commission for Africa continued the implementation of the components of the system, as follows:

(a) Policy: the Commission developed the inter-agency business continuity and organizational resilience management policy, which was approved by the United Nations country team in May 2014. The policy reflects the system policy as endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management and covers all agencies, funds and programmes in Ethiopia;

(b) Governance: the Commission is the leading agency of the inter-agency business continuity management working group established under the umbrella of the Operations Management Team in Ethiopia. The Commission and its partners have also established the inter-agency Crisis Management Team, which focuses on business continuity aspects during a crisis situation;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: the Commission's organizational resilience programme continued with technical support missions to its subregional offices located in Cameroon, Morocco, the Niger, Rwanda and Zambia. The Commission developed a training programme for staff, including senior management. In addition, it conducted routine communication tree tests and telecommuting exercises. The Commission's Crisis Management Team and the inter-agency Crisis Management Team participated in complex simulation exercises;

(d) Risk management: the Commission and its partners conducted annual internal and inter-agency risk assessments. Risk assessment results and recommendations were used to increase resilience through infrastructure improvements on the Commission's premises;

(e) Planning: business continuity, information technology disaster recovery and other emergency plans are regularly reviewed and updated. All plans are harmonized and aligned with the system framework.

30. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean strengthened its compliance with a number of key performance indicators of the system, as follows:

(a) Policy: the Administration actively promulgated the system policy within the organization at the managerial level;

(b) Governance: the Commission assigned a designated programme manager for implementing the emergency management framework according to the principles of the system policy;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: the Commission's first tabletop exercise for testing existing emergency plans was successfully conducted in December 2015 with a group consisting of critical staff and members of the Business Continuity Team. Full-scale testing exercises are foreseen for the first quarter of 2016, again involving critical staff and Business Continuity Team members. The Commission is in the process of developing training programmes on the system for all Commission staff members. It is foreseen that efforts for the development of such a training programme will be coordinated with those of the global working group on the system;

(d) Risk management: the Commission is involved in an ongoing process of assessing and responding to risks to it. During the past months an update of the security-oriented risk assessment, including medical risks to staff members, has been conducted. The security risk assessment includes all agencies, funds and programmes in Santiago. The information technology disaster risk assessment and the enterprise risk management survey have been launched and will help to identify risk related to the Commission's business continuity;

(e) Planning: the Commission made great strides in actualizing and harmonizing emergency management documents, both internally and using United Nations standards, integrating various planning instruments, including risk assessments, enterprise risk management surveys, the system's logical framework matrix and the system playbook template. The Commission has also updated its business continuity plan.

31. Owing to recent incidents in Bangkok, such as the bomb blast, flooding threats and political disturbances, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific was tested regarding its emergency preparedness and response capacity:

(a) Policy: the Commission applies its business continuity plan combined with the security policy framework. In 2016 it will address a more holistic approach when it comes to the definition of its emergency management framework;

(b) Governance: the Commission relies on its Security Management Team and its Operations Management Team to govern its emergency management, focusing especially on business continuity to remain current, effective and responsive during a crisis;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: the above-mentioned incidents demonstrated that the Commission's business continuity and security plans had been well

implemented and that staff were well aware of their responsibilities. To support business continuity, critical function holders were provided with the infrastructure needed to perform their responsibilities remotely;

(d) Risk management: to ensure professional response to risks in the area of information technology disaster recovery, a back-up infrastructure was developed in the Republic of Korea in case the Commission's office in Bangkok should not be accessible. To ensure the availability of medical documents, the Commission undertook a huge effort to digitize such records to ensure their availability in a mass casualty incident;

(e) Planning: as mentioned previously, the maintenance of the business continuity and security plans was of high priority. In addition, the Medical Service in Bangkok contributed to the revision of the mass casualty incident protocol and updated the pandemic contingency plan in close collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO).

32. The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia made progress in the implementation of the system, as follows:

(a) Policy: the Commission adopted the system policy and made policy documents available to the Crisis Management Team members online and, upon recommendation, through the enterprise content management programme. The latter will ensure a stable, centralized and secure repository for all content, which can be accessed by users with appropriate access rights through the Internet. A body of 100 users has been set, comprising the Commission's critical staff and staff dealing with such records on a regular basis;

(b) Governance: under the overall supervision of the Executive Secretary of the Commission, the Director of the Administrative Services Division is the programme manager for the system and acts as the Business Continuity Plan Crisis Coordinator. Under the crisis management framework, the Crisis Management Team, headed by the Executive Secretary, acts as the critical decision-making body for all crisis response. The Critical Response Team, consisting of all section/unit chiefs of the Administrative Services Division and chaired by the Director of the Division, carries out all necessary business continuity activities, while the Chief of the Security and Safety Section maintains a close relationship with the host country authorities in order to remain fully informed of any developments;

(c) Maintenance and exercise: in the framework of the Commission's test and exercise programme, several exercises have been conducted, including annual drill and tabletop exercises. All members of the crisis management structure received training in the principles of the system. In addition, Crisis Management Team members review and update the crisis management system on a quarterly basis. The Commission is working with United Nations Headquarters on the availability of a training programme for the system;

(d) Risk management: the Commission has a risk assessment in place. The Security and Safety Section handles plans related to security and response to emergency systems, and exercises and systems are updated on an annual basis. The United Nations House emergency evacuation and fire plan is approved and periodically updated;

(e) Planning: the Commission has the following plans in place: security plan, crisis management support plan, business continuity plan, information technology disaster recovery plan, emergency communication plan, mass casualty incident response plan and staff support plan. All plans are harmonized within the system framework. The plans are incorporated within the business continuity plan and reviewed on a biannual basis and whenever needed.

Status of implementation in the funds and programmes

33. A total of 17 organizations and entities represented in the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination reported on their progress in implementing the principles of the system policy as endorsed by the Board in December 2014.

World Food Programme

34. The system is being implemented within WFP through the organizational resilience management group, which was established to coordinate the day-to-day implementation of the system. The group comprises the functional area coordinators; monthly meetings are chaired by the Director of Emergencies. The Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer is responsible for:

- Approval of headquarters business continuity plans and maintenance and oversight of the WFP business continuity management programme
- Management of a crisis response at the headquarters level and designation of the Crisis Management Team
- Implementation and maintenance of the WFP crisis management plan

The Director of Emergencies is responsible for the implementation of the system, including the business continuity management programme.

35. A comprehensive WFP headquarters crisis management and business continuity plan was endorsed by all functional areas and submitted to the Executive Management Group for final approval and implementation. The key challenge is to integrate resilience and business continuity management into the operational activities and organizational culture of WFP at all levels. This will require an effective and sustainable exercise, maintenance and review programme. WFP is collaborating with other Rome-based agencies of the United Nations system to provide mutual support in the event of a crisis or disruptive incident.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

36. Forming part of the Crisis Management Team led by the United Nations Office at Geneva, UNHCR requested the United Nations Office at Geneva to provide assistance with the implementation of organizational resilience at its headquarters and field locations and adopted the United Nations Office at Geneva model for the development of an integrated emergency response tool.

United Nations Development Programme

37. The strategic plan for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for 2014-2017 clearly states that UNDP strives to be an organization that promotes resilience. Therefore, UNDP is very committed to making itself resilient and started

the implementation of the system in the beginning of 2015 by revamping its components, namely incident crisis management, enterprise risk management and business continuity management. The assumption is that when all of those programme are implemented, "resilience" will be achieved.

38. The following steps were taken to strengthen UNDP resilience:

(a) A new policy on enterprise risk management was adopted, with clear reference to organizational resilience;

(b) The Crisis Management Group was re-established and is convened at least twice a year;

(c) The business continuity plan was updated and tested;

(d) UNDP established a dashboard system to monitor the implementation of enterprise risk management and business continuity management compliance in all UNDP offices globally and report the result to the Executive Board;

(e) As of 2015, all critical information and communications technology systems are on the cloud, which better ensures their resilience against natural disasters.

39. Main challenges were the introduction of the system to UNDP staff worldwide without making it an additional burden of compliance and in developing a training programme for the system that meets the organization's needs and business model.

United Nations Children's Fund

40. The system is governed by the UNICEF New York Headquarters Crisis Management Team. UNICEF implemented a business continuity management strategy, through which all UNICEF offices must be able to maintain continuity of highly critical functions during and following a disaster and/or crisis event. UNICEF is also working on formally implementing enterprise risk management practices and their monitoring. To achieve harmonization and a more holistic approach to emergency management, the system will be implemented simultaneously with the enterprise risk management initiative.

41. UNICEF achieved compliance with a number of the key performance indicators in the areas of policy and governance. Each headquarters location is an active member of the inter-agency emergency management structures in the respective locations. The planning component poses some challenges as UNICEF proceeds to develop some of the plans, which have become more relevant over the past few years (e.g. crisis communications and mass casualty incident response). In addition, the harmonization of the security, crisis management, business continuity, information technology disaster recovery, crisis communications, mass casualty incident response and staff support plans is envisaged to start in 2016.

42. Additional measures were also taken to strengthen UNICEF resilience in view of an all-hazards approach:

(a) Online emergency management training courses offered in partnership with the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency;

(b) A SharePoint website for all business continuity management/organizational resilience management system focal points to share best practices and upload plans and exercise documents;

(c) The UNICEF Operations Centre continues to provide round-the-clock support to all UNICEF offices globally.

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

43. Since the endorsement of the system policy by the High-level Committee on Management, UNAIDS has strengthened its compliance with several key performance indicators. Priority in its efforts was given to the required components of risk management and the development and maintenance of the emergency preparedness plans. UNAIDS has completed a security and information technology disaster recovery plan and is in the process of updating its plans for business continuity and crisis communications; the mass casualty incident response plan has been integrated into the security plan.

United Nations Population Fund

44. A main focus of implementation of the system by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) was the strengthening of its crisis management and preparedness. A tabletop exercise was conducted with the Security Management Group using a weather-related scenario gradually escalating to a hurricane and leading to the closure of UNFPA headquarters in New York. Subsequent to the tabletop exercise, an emergency communication system was activated and headquarters divisions were tasked with accounting for their personnel through established means of communication. Full accounting of all personnel was accomplished within 30 minutes, with only a few taking up to an hour. Progress was also made in implementing several components of business continuity management. The integration of the minimum preparedness action with business continuity planning and alternate work modality is also progressing well.

United Nations Office for Project Services

45. The main focus was on ensuring efficient decision-making for crisis management in the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which included improving the efficiency of processes related to core elements of the system. In addition, components of the UNOPS security plan were exercised, resulting in improved efficiency. In 2015, the organization established an enterprise risk management programme to further identify and operationalize elements in these areas.

46. Management of the business continuity process is a key priority: full update of all headquarters plans occurred, while work on an overarching framework (including policy development) according to the system is continuing.

47. Much focus has been placed on support to UNOPS personnel, including implementation of additional insurance coverage. UNOPS also contracted a private company that specialized in delivering high-quality care services, including stress counselling, with service available to all personnel on a round-the-clock basis.

48. With the aim of better managing the impact from a threat, UNOPS headquarters recently implemented an emergency notification system to assist in the management of incidents.

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

49. Implementation of the system focused primarily on the development of the business continuity management framework of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), which had been finalized and approved by UN-Women senior management in mid-2014. From this strategic framework, UN-Women then prioritized the development and implementation of headquarters business continuity management and its crisis management plan, while in parallel the development of the Entity's policy in line with the system underwent organizational deliberation.

50. Throughout 2014 and 2015, UN-Women provided workshops on business continuity planning/organizational resilience management system in each of its six regions, targeting operations managers and senior personnel. During that period, field-based UN-Women offices, which include regional offices, country offices and programme presence, systematically migrated existing business continuity plans to the updated UN-Women format. To assist in expediting the process, UN-Women engaged expert consultant services to interact directly with each of its 93 locations; to date approximately 80 per cent of UN-Women field locations have fully functional business continuity plans, with full compliance envisaged by November 2015.

51. UN-Women initiated a number of additional actions that will complement and enhance the system strategy, including:

(a) A dedicated portal for the system within the Safety and Security Section's intranet site, containing, among others, the emergency preparedness plans, as well as the contact information of global focal points, best practice models and educational material;

(b) Procurement of an emergency notification system that is capable of multiple field use, based on a three-tiered permissions process;

(c) UN-Women enterprise risk management, currently under development, will interface with the system and with the Safety and Security Section;

(d) Alternate sites for UN-Women have been and will be tested before the end of 2015;

(e) Global issuance of satellite phones to all field locations, which will be finalized by the end of 2015, and where applicable, primarily at regional and multi-country offices, the pre-positioning of broadband global area network systems.

Status of implementation in the specialized agencies

52. A number of specialized agencies strengthened their emergency management by applying the coordinated approach required by the system policy.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

53. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is considering a project for the implementation of the system both at headquarters and in the field. The current proposal builds on existing elements in the areas of business continuity, crisis management and information technology disaster recovery in place, as follows:

(a) A Crisis Management Team exists and is chaired by the Deputy Director General for Operations. The Team's operating procedures need to be made system-compliant and exercised;

(b) A draft business continuity plan and a detailed draft crisis management playbook have been prepared for integration and harmonization within the system;

(c) Information technology disaster recovery capabilities are being created to mitigate the risk of information technology failures.

54. In the preparation of the plans, FAO will work together with the other Rome-based United Nations system organizations in order to ensure optimal use of existing infrastructure and capabilities.

International Atomic Energy Agency

55. In accordance with the system policy approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/254 A, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed the incident management system as an overarching framework for emergency management. The incident management system enhances the Agency's preparedness, response, continuity and recovery capabilities in case of adverse incidents, offering an integrated and holistic approach aligned with the organizational resilience management system framework.

56. IAEA has strengthened its compliance with a number of key performance indicators, focusing its efforts on crisis management and business continuity. A major effort went into the development and testing of the crisis management plan. The plan was developed to work in conjunction with the crisis management standard operating procedures and the Crisis Management Team playbook of the United Nations Office at Vienna. As foreseen in the organizational resilience management system approach, IAEA adheres to the joint security and mass casualty incident plan of the Office and maintains its own emergency plans in the areas of information technology disaster recovery and business continuity.

57. Late in 2014, as part of the process of updating the business continuity plans, 130 staff members were nominated as business continuity planning focal points and trained to conduct a business impact analysis of the critical business processes of their respective administrative units. A business continuity planning knowledge management platform was launched in February 2015 to monitor the progress of the project and to ensure that staff members always have accurate and up-to-date information and are empowered to assume their critical functions.

International Fund for Agricultural Development

58. Long before the approval of the organizational resilience management system policy for the United Nations system organizations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) had developed all the necessary components of a

professional emergency preparedness system: starting from the enterprise risk management policy, IFAD had developed a business continuity management system and established a crisis management structure. Components of those two systems include the plans for business continuity, security, information technology disaster recovery, crisis communications, staff support and medical emergency support, as well as the specific security risk assessment.

59. Since the endorsement of the system policy for all entities of the United Nations common system, IFAD has initiated the harmonization between the existing emergency preparedness systems, polices and plans.

International Labour Organization

60. The crisis management system of the International Labour Organization (ILO) is well developed and has been tested on numerous occasions, including during the Ebola crisis. All ILO locations maintain a crisis management playbook and wallet cards, providing the governing bodies and all staff members with the information necessary to respond to a beginning crisis. Roles and responsibilities, as well as issues of coordination with other United Nations entities and information about business continuity, are included in the different playbooks. The ILO enterprise risk management framework requires that risk registers address safety, health and security and regularly monitor these risks.

61. ILO is an active member of the Geneva-based inter-agency working group on the system.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

62. At the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), there is an ongoing effort to enhance its crisis management response capacity, both at the Vienna International Centre and in the field, in order to make it more comprehensive, coordinated, timely and effective, as well as to further harmonize it with the system framework, endorsed by the High-level Committee on Management and the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination in 2014. Such a response implies involvement and eventual rearranging of different functions and is not limited to security aspects.

63. The crisis management standard operating procedures administered by the United Nations Office at Vienna enable the Vienna-based organizations, including UNIDO, to effectively set out in a coordinated manner the policy and decision-making processes for managing a crisis event at the Vienna International Centre, minimizing its effects and maintaining the mission-critical functions and essential processes. The standard operating procedures also outline a supporting structure and a number of procedures to respond to and minimize the effects of a crisis event. They identify the key players, both at the policy and operational levels, and explain their roles in the overall crisis management.

Universal Postal Union

64. At the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the system has been traditionally treated as part of the crisis management and business continuity plan. According to those plans, all directorates are required to participate in the annual risk and control

self-assessment, which the UPU secretariat undertakes as part of its internal control system framework.

World Health Organization

65. The lead role of WHO in the response to Ebola underlined the importance of a well-functioning organizational resilience management system. Consequently, WHO strengthened its resilience by further developing plans for immediate emergency response, crisis management, including activation of recovery plans and crisis communications, and a strategy for information technology disaster recovery, as well as specific recovery plans for all departments. Those plans are embedded in policy and guidance documents that also provide direction for business continuity management. WHO intends to align all its emergency preparedness policies and documents with the United Nations system-wide organizational resilience management system.

World Intellectual Property Organization

66. In February 2015, as an overarching framework for its emergency management, WIPO adopted and published its policy, strategy and processes according to the organizational resilience management system.

67. In order to strengthen its resilience, WIPO created a Crisis Management Team, chaired by the Director General, which underwent its first training exercise, applying the Team's terms of reference and checklists, which were developed on the basis of the inter-agency crisis management playbook.

68. Its first emergency notification system was implemented towards the end of 2014 and is now automatically included in all internal security emergency training and exercises.

69. April 2015 saw the launch of a large-scale cross-sector exercise to undertake the second WIPO business impact analysis. The analysis will not only reconfirm critical WIPO business functions but also update the identification and cross-referencing of critical business processes and priorities for reconstitution following an emergency event. This business impact analysis exercise covers headquarters and all WIPO external offices. In addition, WIPO strengthened its resilience through the following:

(a) Information and communications technology disaster recovery plans, which are being tested and continue to be expanded;

(b) A 24/7 security helpline, which was widely publicized to all staff;

(c) A specific organizational resilience intranet site, which is being developed.

IV. Progress in the implementation of the recommendations from the after-action review of storm Sandy

70. In its resolution 68/247 B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to complete the recommendations emanating from the after-action review of storm Sandy and to consider all means of risk mitigation, including through the

insurance market and/or self-insurance mechanisms, with a view to securing adequate coverage at a reasonable cost for all United Nations installations and premises exposed to natural hazards and emergencies.

71. In his briefing to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on 7 October 2014, the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services informed the members of the Committee that all 25 recommendations from the after-action review of storm Sandy had been completed. The recommendations aimed to minimize the vulnerability of United Nations Headquarters to extensive flooding and to mitigate the impact if it did occur. Furthermore, they sought to strengthen key elements of the organizational resilience management system, including operational risk management, crisis decision-making and crisis communications. The paragraphs above on progress in the implementation of the system at United Nations Headquarters provide a detailed description of ongoing measures to strengthen Headquarters resilience.

72. A specific briefing on the status of United Nations Headquarters preparedness for natural disasters was given to the Crisis Operations Group at its meeting on 9 June 2015, which confirmed the readiness of Headquarters and described best possible solutions for the protection of the United Nations compound and its infrastructure, as well as the strong means to ensure the continuity of critical business services.

73. During the renewal of the global property insurance policy, the United Nations Secretariat was able to secure renewal of the policy with significantly higher, post-capital master plan exposure at a reduced premium rate. This was due to the extensive renovations, including risk mitigation measures, at Headquarters, as well as a robust global marketing exercise. This combination enabled the Organization to maximize the highest level of coverage at the most competitive premium. It should also be noted that this includes flood coverage at the maximum level available and self-insuring the gaps, so that the insurance policy in force remains the best possible value for money.

V. Next steps in implementation

74. In accordance with the implementation strategy directed by the Senior Emergency Policy Team, following implementation of the organizational resilience management system at Headquarters, the focus of implementation has been placed on the offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, field missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs and specialized agencies, funds and programmes. Three mutually supporting tracks are being pursued:

(a) Continue promoting coordination among different key players of the system and the different United Nations entities, inter alia by using the inter-agency global working group on the system as a community of practice that shares experience and lessons learned;

(b) Share materials for awareness-raising and learning among the different United Nations entities and provide tools to business departments to facilitate the conduct of the maintenance, exercise and review regime;

(c) Leverage opportunities to further embed the framework's tenets in organizational culture by mainstreaming emergency management in day-to-day activities.

VI. Cost of the organizational resilience management system

75. In section III of its resolution 68/247 B, the General Assembly requested a detailed accounting of the cost of the organizational resilience management system in the context of future reports.

76. The organizational resilience management system within the United Nations system represents a systemic approach in the coordination, harmonization and integration of different components that contribute to the United Nations system-wide emergency management framework.

77. The strength of the organizational resilience management system policy is the requirement that all relevant stakeholders coordinate and harmonize their emergency preparedness, prevention, response and recovery efforts. The system provides the umbrella under which to gain effectiveness and efficiency through close collaboration of the key components.

78. In terms of the investment of staff time for the coordination of emergency preparedness, the table below provides some indication of time spent in 2015 at different duty stations and within different United Nations entities. The investments vary depending on the situation of the duty stations and the individual entity. The total cost of the time spent by staff on the system is estimated at $390,000 for all participating entities. The United Nations Secretariat invested $250,000, of which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support needed $155,000 for support for field missions.

79. At United Nations Headquarters, the first efforts to apply a holistic approach to emergency preparedness started in 2010 with the organizational resilience policy for the United Nations Headquarters. Subsequently, the coordination, harmonization and integration of key components have become the regular way of doing business in preparing the Secretariat for an emergency. For other entities and duty stations the system represents a new approach; they therefore need additional efforts to put it in place.

Staff resources used to coordinate the different components of the organizational resilience management system

Position	*Department/office*	*Days per annum*
Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services	DM/OCSS	1.0
Chief, Business Continuity Management Unit (P-5)	DM/OCSS/BCMU	25.0
Business Continuity Specialist (P-4)	DM/OCSS/BCMU	15.0
Organizational Resilience Officer (P-4)	DPKO/OUSG	200.0
Focal Point for Security (P-5)	DPKO/OUSG	20.0
Business Continuity Programme Manager (P-4)	UNOG/DOA	10.0
Business Continuity Programme Manager (P-4)	UNON	25.0
Chief, General Support Section (P-5)	UNOV	33.0

Position	*Department/office*	*Days per annum*
Chief of Administration (D-1)	ECLAC	2.0
Chief of Facilities Management (NO-C)	ECLAC	3.0
Information Systems Assistant (G-5)	ECLAC	10.0
Chief of Central Support Services	ESCAP	9.0
Security Officer (P-4)	ESCWA	1.0
Administrative Officer (P-3)	ESCWA	1.0
Administrative Assistant (G-6)	ESCWA	8.0
–	FAO[a]	–
Central Security Coordinator (P-5)	IAEA	10.0
Associate Security Facilitation Officer (P-1)	IAEA	5.0
Manager for Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (P-4)	ITU	11.0
Chief, Financial Services, Risk Management and Compliance (D-1)	UNAIDS	1.5
Senior Compliance Officer (P-5)	UNAIDS	5.0
Enterprise Risk Management Officer (P-4)	UNDP	30.0
Security Coordinator (D-1)	UNFPA	4.0
Deputy Executive Director (ASG)	UNICEF	10.0
Business Continuity Manager (P-4)	UNICEF	60.0
Coordinator, Governance, Risks Controlling and Management Information (P-5)	UPU	10.0
Expert, Governance, Risks Controlling and Information Management (P-2)	UPU	10.0
Director (D-1)	UNIDO	1.0
Senior Security Coordinator (P-5)	UNIDO	3.0
Global Security Adviser (P-5)	UN-Women	10.0
Deputy Executive Director (D-2)	WFP	1.5
Senior Adviser of Business Continuity (P-5)	WFP	5.0
Director, Compliance, Risk Management, Ethics (D-1)	WHO	5.0
Manager, Platform Services	WHO	5.0

[a] Coordination/integration will start in 2016.

VII. Action to be taken by the General Assembly

80. **The General Assembly is requested to take note of the present report on progress in applying the principles of the organizational resilience management system in the United Nations system-wide emergency management framework.**